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THE PRICE OF
THE CLBRTJY IMAGE AS A
FAMECOMMODy AND TH RiGFAM OFu,,
bv Tv Ford
routinely signed long-term exclusive contracts, allowing
studio executives to control their images and careers. 4 In
today's Hollywood, the movie stars themselves develop
their own projects with lucrative vanity production com-
pany deals 5 and often receive "points" as part of their
compensation package.6 Thus, although the studios still
bankroll the vast majority of studio pictures, the real
power in much of the decision-making process has come
into the hands of the actors themselves.
With this power shift has come an increasingly liti-
gious effort by top movie stars to control the use of their
likenesses and to reap the monetary rewards that come
from those images. No longer will a star freely lend his
name and face to a film out of loyal support to a studio or
project, hoping to reap a career boost for his efforts.
Today's top movie stars want money for the use of their
images, and they want more of it than ever.
Given the expanding market for movie merchandising
and the use of star images in advertising, movie stars are
turning to the legal system to attain compensation when-
ever their likenesses are used without explicit contractu-
al approval. This self-interest is not without legal sup-
port. For instance, using privacy and publicity tort
claims, celebrities may have the right to recover finan-
cially when their image is used without express permis-
sion.
This Note will examine several recent cases that illus-
trate how major stars are using the ever-widening scope
of such doctrines to control their images in the media.
These examples show how the right of publicity has
evolved from a right designed to protect a performer's
uniquely personal attributes and stylings from unautho-
rized (and unpaid for) exploitation into a legal fortress
constructed around movie-star images that allows the
star to separate unwanted attention from necessary pop-
ularity. Furthermore, it will explore the inherent contra-
dictions in such a development, showing how it can be
used to manipulate and control the very peripheral
industries, such as the media and film studios, that
helped to create the celebrity's revered "image."
THE RIGHTS OF PRIVACY
AND PUBLICITY
The right of privacy is, essentially, the right to be left
alone. 7 The right of publicity, on the other hand, is the
right of each individual to control and profit from the
commercial value of his or her own identity.8 While even
the average individual has a right of privacy, practically
f im tv n te
speaking, only highly visible public figures such as
celebrities who have some commercial value in their
names and likenesses can make use of the right of pub-
licity.
9
Although the right to privacy as a legally enforceable
right is largely a 20th century development, its roots are
generally traced to a landmark article published in
1890.10 In a piece entitled, "The Right to Privacy,"
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote, "[N]ow the
right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life-the
right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures the exer-
cise of extensive civil privileges; and the term 'property'
has grown to comprise every form of possession-intan-
gible, as well as tangible. ' 1
Fleshing out the Warren and Brandeis theory decades
later, Dean William Prosser articulated four categories of
torts associated with a common law right to personal pri-
vacy. These are: (1) intrusion unto plaintiff's seclusion or
solitude, (2) public discourse of embarrassing private
facts about the plaintiff, (3) publicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and (4) appro-
priation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness. 12 The first three Prosser privacy vio-
lations protect an individual from mental harm resulting
from unwelcome publicity, while the fourth focuses on the
property interest in one's own image, protecting against
misuse of that person's name or likeness for commercial
gain.1 3 Many states, including California, have recog-
nized these four causes of action within their case law.
But because this fourth right of privacy is similar to the
right of publicity, many courts have trouble distinguish-
ing between the two-or simply refuse to recognize any
difference at all.
14
At times, the similarities appear to warrant such
treatment. The "appropriation" right of privacy claim
has three basic elements: the use of one's name or like-
ness in an (1) identifiable manner, (2) without consent,
and (3) in situations in which the invasion benefits the
wrongdoer.15 The right of publicity is similarly defined
as the right of each individual to control and profit from
the commercial value of his or her own identity-essen-
tially a self-property right.16
There are, nonetheless, important differences, espe-
cially in the respective scopes of the two types of rights.
The right of privacy is a personal, nonassignable right
that only the injured party himself or herself may
assert.1 7 However, the right to publicity is assignable
and can be passed along to heirs. 18 A number of cases
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dealing with the descendibility and assignability of the
right of publicity have surrounded the estate of Elvis
Presley. In Elvis Presley International Memorial
Foundation v. Crowell, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee
ruled that the right was descendible, both from the com-
mon law right of publicity and a state statute.19
The right of publicity was first recognized as separate
from the right of privacy in the 1953 case Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum. There, the
Second Circuit held that "in addition to and independent
of the right of privacy . . .a
man has a right in the publici-
ty value of his photograph, i.e.,
the right to grant the exclusive
privilege of publishing his pic-
ture."20  The policy objective
behind this celebrity-only
right is to guard against
unjust enrichment and to promote creativity by offering
financial incentives for the cultivation of a unique per-
sona.
2 1
That idea-the heart of the right of publicity-was
addressed by the Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co. 2 2 Zacchini, who made his liv-
ing performing a "human cannonball" stunt at state fairs
and other events, sued a television news channel for
broadcasting footage of the live stunt.2 3 The performer
argued that providing the public with free viewing of his
stunt diminished the economic value of his personal
appearances; the news organization cited the First
Amendment's freedom-of-the-press and the Fourteenth
Amendment's incorporation of this right in their
defense. 2 4 Recognizing the tangible economic value of
the right of publicity (in this case, profit from a unique
performance), the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution did not grant the media a free license to
broadcast such a unique performance without payment
to the performer.
2 5
The Zacchini decision is a reasonable and fair enforce-
ment of the right of publicity in its purest form, but the
subsequent cases 2 6 analyzed in this Note represent an
expansion and ultimate distortion of that right. Where
Zacchini was a case of a local celebrity whose livelihood
depended on the cultivation of a unique performance
(akin to a "secret recipe"), these cases represent abun-
dantly wealthy movie and television stars attempting to
exert dominion over the use, discussion, and parody of
aspects of their "images" that are as much the creation of
those they seek to sue (e.g., the press) as themselves.
The essential problem with the right of publicity is
deciding at which point it should stop expanding.
Certainly celebrities, like everyone else, have the right to
protect themselves from certain misuses of their good
names. But as the following cases suggest, the right to
publicity is no longer about protection from harm, but
about exploitation for financial gain the attention that is
inherently part of their chosen profession. Have these
celebrities truly been "wronged" or "harmed" or "dam-
aged"? Or have their egos
just run amok?
The principal limit on how
far the rights of publicity and
privacy can be extended may
well be the First Amendment.
Celebrities, as well as non-
celebrities, have a right to be
protected against defamation, and as the Supreme Court
said in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 7 libel is one of
the few classes of speech that the First Amendment does
not protect. Even so, the Court decided, state libel law
could not provide a remedy unless the plaintiff proved
the false statement was made with 'actual malice'-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless dis-
regard of whether it was false or not. '2 8 The Sullivan
Court reasoned that prohibiting any speech that may
contain untruths "dampens the vigor and limits the vari-
ety of public debate' 2 9 and would only lead to an artifi-
cial degree of self-censorship born of fear of libel
actions. 30 Therefore, the Court concluded that only
knowingly false statements constituted an impermissible
use of the otherwise unrestricted freedom of speech.
The Sullivan reasoning naturally extends to the right
of publicity. While a celebrity certainly has the right to
protect his good name from false defamation, his celebri-
ty status does not entitle him to insulation against any
sort of "bad press" or negative criticism in the press. To
the contrary, celebrities in the entertainment industry
have skillfully and deliberately sought out their celebrity
by their choice of profession. Their celebrity status is a
voluntary, conscious, and usually welcome by-product of
their vocation. Accordingly, like the politicians who had
to accept the critical advertisement in Sullivan, movie
stars must accept the occasional bad press that accompa-
nies the fame and for1une of showbiz.
That is not to suggest,>h wever, that the courts should
allow no recourse when celebrities are unlawfully
defamed or when their images, names, or likenesses are
misappropriated. But like other public figures, showbiz
celebrities-by virtue of the mass-market nature of their
business, their public performances, and the publicity
they voluntarily generate to promote their various proj-
ects-should accept that their images take on a life of
their own by becoming a part of the popular culture. As
such, movie stars cannot expect to attain a certain level
of notoriety and fame in their careers and then expect the
courts to shield them from unfavorable aspects of a free
press they cannot directly control.
BAD PRESS IS LUCRATIVE
PRESS: CLINT EASTWOOD
An old Hollywood adage goes, "Even bad press is good
press." That may hold true for up-and-coming starlets,
but once major stars have made a name for themselves,
negative press generally comes as a positive only when it
comes with something else-lucrative lawsuits.
Nowhere is this phenomenon more obvious than in cases
of supermarket tabloids, which have traditionally
thrived by inventing or inflating scandalous celebrity
"stories." Nowadays, the celebrity tabloid lawsuit is
almost as commonplace as the tabloids themselves, but
in 1983 when Clint Eastwood decided that one tabloid
had gone too far, the story was front-page news. 3 1
The National Enquirer had run a typically sensation-
alistic cover story and "article" detailing Eastwood's
alleged love triangle with long-term, live-in lover Sondra
Locke and country singer Tanya Tucker.32 Apparently
less thick-skinned than his Dirty Harry alter-ego, the
star filed suit, claiming both that the story was false and
that the publishers had improperly used his name and
likeness without his consent. Two main causes of action
emerged from Eastwood's suit-one for false light inva-
sion of privacy and one for commercial misappropriation
of his name, photograph, and likeness under both state
common law and California Civil Code section 3344.33 As
construed by Eastwood, this section of the Civil Code
applied because celebrity photos on the covers of maga-
zines constitute advertising of a product-in this case,
the magazine itself. Thus, the right of publicity was vio-
lated unless the magazine obtained the proper consent.
The Enquirer's defense rested largely on a theory that
its printing of Eastwood's name and photograph was
privileged as part of a news account. 3 4 Focusing on the
inevitable conflict between the right of publicity and the
First Amendment, the magazine emphasized the impor-
f lm/tv n te
tance of the latter. Where blatant attempts to capitalize
on the fame of a celebrity might fall victim to the right of
publicity, the public interest in Hollywood news reporting
required that the Enquirer's stories receive a First
Amendment grant of immunity. Moreover, the reality of
the situation, the Enquirer argued, weighed in its favor.
If the California Code were interpreted as Eastwood sug-
gested, then the entire movie magazine industry would
be subject to liability any time it published a celebrity
photo without specific consent. Given the fact that
celebrities depend on attention from the media for their
livelihoods, would such a situation make sense? How
could printing a picture of someone whose career revolves
around being photographed possibly be illegal?
To begin with, the Eastwood v. National Enquirer, Inc.
court answered by acknowledging the value of celebrity
image, stating, "[b]ecause of a celebrity's audience
appeal, people respond almost automatically to a celebri-
ty's name or picture. '3 5 But it lamented that such exclu-
sive photographs and stories-as parts of a "scoop"-
could amount to a commercial advantage over other com-
peting celebrity-news publications, thereby theoretically
opening up a case for "commercial exploitation" of name,
photograph, and likeness when used in magazine sto-
ries.
3 6
More interesting, though, was the court's dealing with
the article in the context of First Amendment freedom-of-
the-press right. While first acknowledging that "[p]ubli-
cation of matters in the public interest, which rests on
the right of the public to know, and the freedom of the
press to tell it, cannot ordinarily be actionable," 3 7 the
court explicitly ruled that celebrity news stories-what
used to be thought of merely as gossip column fare-were
legitimate fodder for the press, and therefore, potentially
protected by the First Amendment. However, since
Eastwood's suit rested on his assertion that this particu-
lar story was false and libelous, the court recognized a
more difficult task:
Here we are called upon to determine the
boundaries of Eastwood's ability to control the
commercial exploitation of his personality in
the publication field. This determination will
necessitate a weighing of the private interest
of the right of publicity against matters of pub-
lic interest calling for constitutional protec-
tion, and a consideration of the character of
these competing interests. 38
In considering the constitutional issue, the court contin-
T FD:
ued:
[A]bsolute protection of the press in the case at
bench requires a total sacrifice of the compet-
ing interest of Eastwood in controlling the
commercial exploitation of his personality.
Often considerable money, time and energy are
needed to develop the ability in a person's
name or likeness to attract attention and
evoke a desired response in a particular con-
sumer market.
39
The Eastwood court went on to allow the action
against the Enquirer based on the theory that "the delib-
erate fictionalization of Eastwood's personality" failed to
qualify for First Amendment protection and instead
"[constituted] commercial exploitation" of the actor's
interest in his own name and likeness 40 In the end, this
case, oft-cited in similar celebrity/tabloid suits, also
paved the way for the California courts' expansion of
Sullivan to include the entire range of Hollywood celebri-
ty.
In 1984, just one year after Eastwood, California
amended Section 3344 to encompass any unauthorized
use "on or in products, merchandise, or goods .... 41
This broadened the scope of the statute by no longer
requiring that the unauthorized use be in advertise-
ments to fall within the California statute's protection.
4 2
Subsequent cases also extended the scope of protection,
including celebrities and non-celebrities alike, and pro-
viding for a minimum damage aware of $750 even if no
actual damages are proven.
4 3
PUBLICITY PHOTOS DON'T COME
CHEAP: DUSTIN HOFFMAN
Building on Eastwood's recognition of the celebrity's
image as a valuable asset, a 1999 case involving Dustin
Hoffman expanded the right to publicity even more.
Hoffman sued Los Angeles Magazine for superimposing a
publicity photograph of his head from the 1982 movie
Tootsie onto the body of a female model in an otherwise
normal fashion layout. 44 Hoffman's argument largely
depended on a theory that by superimposing his head on
the body of a model wearing designer clothing, Los
Angeles Magazine was falsely implying an endorsement
by Hoffman of that clothing designer, Richard Tyler.
45
The case thus presented issues similar to Eastwood (e.g.,
right to publicity), but ultimately raised the question
whether an actor has an ownership interest in a fictional
character.
The fact statement in the opinion sets the tone for the
decision, calling Hoffman "truly one of our country's liv-
ing treasures" and listing his Academy Awards and
industry achievements in a paragraph Hoffman's publi-
cist probably wishes she had written.46 Further justify-
ing the actor's image as a commodity, the court noted
that Hoffman "maintains a strict policy of not endorsing
commercial products for fear that he will be perceived in
a negative light by his peers and motion picture industry
executives, suggesting that his career is in decline and
that he no longer has the business opportunities or the
box office draw as before."4 7 Unsurprisingly, Hoffman's
case succeeded, and he was awarded $1.5 million in com-
pensatory damages, plus punitive damages and attor-
ney's fees. 48 The court explained: "Los Angeles Magazine
•.. was aware the celebrities are sensitive and particular
regarding the manner in which they are depicted in pho-
tographs."4 9 It may just as well have added, "Now they
really know just how sensitive."
The Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. decision,
while perhaps legally sound, is potentially bad policy.
First of all, the image in question is arguably not owned
by Dustin Hoffman himself-or at least not by him alone.
The picture used was a publicity still of Hoffman from
Tootsie, in which he played a struggling actor who resorts
to dressing as a woman to land a part on a soap opera.
Hoffman's theory of recovery was based largely on the
supposition that the layout implied that he endorsed the
clothing. If anything, the layout would seem to suggest
that the character Hoffman played in Tootsie-and not
Hoffman himself-was appearing as an endorser. But
the court failed to address the notion that a sixteen year-
old publicity still from a movie of an actor in full make-
up, costume, and character-which, outside of the notori-
ety of the movie itself, makes Hoffman unrecognizable as
his present self-might not imply a personal endorse-
ment of the actor underneath the costume and makeup.
In the photograph in question, Hoffman is arguably not
appearing as himself but as Dorothy, his Tootsie charac-
ter. Furthermore, given the numerous intellectual prop-
erty implications, it may be unwise to allow Hoffman
alone to lay claim to his image when he is effectively dis-
guised beneath costumes and makeup created by other
individuals, in service to a character, dreamed up by a
screenwriter. What about Columbia Pictures, who owns
the copyright to the movie Tootsie and the characters in
it? 50 What about the photographer who took the picture
of Hoffman used by Los Angeles Magazine?5 1 In other
words, as the right to publicity expands, it potentially
does so at the expense of not only the First Amendment
but copyright law as well. Is this what the courts, and
the statutes they rely on, intend?
The Hoffman decision also greatly expands the possi-
bilities of litigation between celebrities and the maga-
zines which exist largely to promote them. Publications
like Los Angeles Magazine, which are little more than
puppets for Hollywood publicists, are designed to sell,
glorify, and lionize the images of movie stars. To under-
stand this, one must examine the context in which the
offending Hoffman photograph was published. 52 As part
of a fashion spread entitled "Grand Illusions," Hoffman's
Tootsie photo was placed in the company of other movie
"legends" such as Humphrey Bogart and Cary Grant,
whose heads were also superimposed on the bodies of
models. 5 3 Thus, rather than damaging Hoffman's image,
the magazine actually bolstered it, placing Hoffman
alongside some of the most esteemed motion picture
actors in history. Moreover, con-
fusion was hardly an issue, as
the title of the spread ("Grand
Illusions") explicitly suggested
that the photographs were doc- _
tored. Los Angeles Magazine
even accompanied the photos _ _
with the blurb, "By using state-
of-the-art digital magic, we clothed some of cinema's most
enduring icons in fashions by the hottest designers.' '5 4
Finally, since many of the other celebrity "models" in the
"Grand Illusions" spread were long deceased, it seems
silly to claim that anyone would be fooled into thinking
the actors were part of an implied endorsement.
Nevertheless, the Hoffman decision goes beyond
Eastwood to give celebrities more control over the use of
their photographs-even in publications devoted to pro-
viding them with the very publicity they seek to protect.
It is doubtful Los Angeles Magazine had any intent other
than to celebrate one of Hoffman's most popular per-
formances. 5 5 Yet this decision will surely make magazine
editors think twice before publishing any sort of photo
spread without the celebrity's express approval-which,
of course, will likely only come in cases of promotion of
that celebrity's latest movie role.
THE VERY THOUGHT OF ME:
VANNA WHITE
Whereas the Hoffman case involved a printed maga-
f Imtv n te
zine page which was arguably not even advertising, an
earlier case dealt with implied celebrity endorsements in
a more direct way. In 1993, Wheel of Fortune's Vanna
White successfully sued Samsung Electronics for a print
advertisement which depicted a C3PO-like robot, clad in
a dress, jewelry, and a blonde wig, turning Wheel of
Fortune-like letters. 5 6 Unlike Eastwood and Hoffman,
White did not veil her motive in claims of hurt feelings or
damaged public image; she just wanted to be paid for the
alleged use of her likeness.
The Ninth Circuit admitted that Samsung did not
"make use of White's name or likeness," but said that the
right of privacy was not limited to such. 57 The court
found that even though the robot could theoretically rep-
resent someone else, White's position as the only female
letter-turner on TV gave rise to the conclusion that
Samsung had "appropriated her identity. ' 58 The court
rejected Samsung's parody defense, saying the commer-
cial intent of such an advertisement distinguished it from
other parodies: "The difference
between a 'parody' and a 'knock-
off' is the difference between fun
and profit.
'59
I In a wickedly entertaining
'dissent
60 to the denial of
__ __ Samsung's rehearing request,
Judge Kozinski of the Ninth
Circuit 6 1 summarized the policy implications of the deci-
sion. He wrote:
Concerned about what it sees as a wrong done
to Vanna White, the panel majority erects a
property right of remarkable and dangerous
breadth. Under the majority's opinion, it's
now a tort for advertisers to remind the public
of a celebrity. Not to use a celebrity's name,
voice, signature, or likeness; not to imply the
celebrity endorses a product; but simply to
evoke the celebrity's image in the public's
mind.
6 2
That is, the advertisement in question did not mention
White by any other direct means, but simply seemed to
evoke her image, White claimed, by placing a feminine
figure-a robot in a dress and wig, hardly resembling
White in any individual sense-in a setting which evoked
the TV show with which she has become synonymous.
The court's decision in favor of White was based on the
reasoning that her right to publicity was violated by a
"clever advertising strategist" who avoided paying White
T F RD
for the use of her name and likeness while still remind-
ing the public of her, "effectively eviscerat[ing] her
rights."
6 3
As Kozinski warned, this decision spins the notion of
public domain and its role in intellectual property law
into very broad territory, where celebrities could poten-
tially have the power to file and win lawsuits whenever
someone else even evokes their image without permis-
sion. Thus, the dissent lamented:
Overprotecting intellectual property is as
harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is
impossible without a rich public domain.
Nothing today, likely nothing since we tamed
fire, is genuinely new. Culture, like science
and technology, grows by accretion, each new
creator building on the works of those who
came before it. Overprotection stifles the very
creative forces it's supposed to nurture. 64
As an alternative, Kozinski proposed a parody exception
to the right of publicity under California law. By not
allowing for such, he argued, the court had contradicted
the federal Copyright Act-including long-standing fair
use provisions.6 5 After all, nothing in the advertisement
evoked White personally. Rather, the setting of the
photo-reminiscent of Wheel of Fortune-most directly
contributed to the similarity.66 Without that game
board, White's image would not have been evoked. 6 7 And
while White may be the most famous Wheel of Fortune
hostess, she is certainly not the first or only letter-turner
in the show's history. In other words, it's just as likely
that White's image was conjured up as a by-product of a
parody of the game show from which she derives her
celebrity.
This decision also rais-
es serious First
Amendment issues. The
court based its reasoning
on the context of the-E
Samsung advertisement
as commercial speech, rf
which is less protected by the First Amendment than
noncommercial speech. 68  But "less protected" still
means protected. Do celebrities like White now have
absolute power to keep others from evoking their image
in the public mind whenever the speech can be charac-
terized as commercial? 6 9  What's next? May Jack
Nicholson sue Christian Slater if Slater appears in a
commercial simply because Slater's voice and manner-
isms are apparently Nicholson-esque in the minds of
many people?70 Are all commercial parodies illegal?
DOPPLEGANGERS, BEWARE!:
WOODY ALLEN
A somewhat similar case to White v. Samsung
Electronics America 71 that appeared in a New York dis-
trict court eight years prior was a suit brought by actor-
director Woody Allen against a video store chain. The
store had used an Allen lookalike named Phil Boroff in a
print advertisement.7 2 Allen claimed that the video store
had used his likeness without his permission, violating
his right to privacy under New York Civil Rights law.7 3 In
deciding for Allen, the court essentially deemed that
another individual had violated a celebrity's rights sim-
ply because he physically resembled the celebrity and
appeared in an advertisement.
Under New York common law, a plaintiff must satisfy
three prongs to succeed on a right to privacy7 4 claim.
These include: (1) use of his or her name, portrait or pic-
filmitv note
ture, (2) for commercial or trade purposes, (3) without
written permission. Merely suggesting certain charac-
teristics of the plaintiff, without literally using his or her
name, portrait, or picture, is not actionable under the
statute.7 5 With the second and third prongs satisfied by
the fact that Boroff appeared in an advertisement with-
out Allen's permission, Allen's burden in the case was to
prove that Boroff's appearance appropriated Allen's "por-
trait or picture."
If a clearly recognizable painting or cartoon of Allen
had been used, then the "portrait or picture" prong would
have been satisfied. 76 However, what this case really
deals with is a person's "right to his own identity and his
own face."7 7 Indeed, the
court stated the main
issue as "the almost
metaphysical question of
when one person's face,
presented in a certain
context, becomes, as a
matter of law, the face of another. ' 78 Ultimately, though,
the Allen v. National Video, Inc. court declined to answer
this question. Instead, it found in Allen's favor under the
Lanham Act, which involved false representation in
goods or services in interstate commerce. 7 9 While this
resolved the case at bar, it left critical issues still to be
decided by the courts. May celebrities someday be able
to lay claim under the law to the images of other people
who resemble them physically if those other people
appear in commercial contexts? Can a celebrity claim
ownership to fashion choices, hairstyles, mannerisms,
and bone structure in combination? Allen does not
appear to foreclose that possibility.
YOU CAN'T TAKE YOUR MOST
FAMOUS CHARACTER WITH YOU:
BELA LUGOSI
The previous cases rest on issues of a celebrity's own-
ership of his or her personal image, but what about
images of an actor created in conjunction with a movie
role? Hoffman, in dealing with a photograph of the actor
in costume of a specific role, seemed to pose this question,
yet the court did not touch on it. In Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures, 80 however, the heirs to the late horror-movie
star Bela Lugosi sued Lugosi's former studio for licensing
the use of the character of Count Dracula, which Lugosi
played in a 1930 film.
Written in 1897, the Brain Stoker novel, Dracula, had
TFRD
always been in the public domain in the United States.
Nevertheless, Universal purchased the film rights from
Stoker's widow in order to produce its 1930 film.
8 1
Lugosi's contract with Universal to play Dracula explicit-
ly gave the film's producer the right to exploit "any and
all of the [actor's] acts, poses, plays, and appearance" and
to use Lugosi's name and likeness in any advertising and
exploitation in connection with the movie. 82 In 1960,
four years after Lugosi's death, Universal entered the
first of over fifty licensing agreements with various busi-
nesses for the use of the Count Dracula character in con-
nection with certain products.
83
Essentially, the Supreme Court of California held that
Lugosi could have created a property right, but didn't.
During his lifetime, Lugosi had never used his name or
likeness as Dracula in connection with any business,
product, or service. 8 4 This proved to be a crucial fact in
the court's ultimate holding that Lugosi's heirs were not
entitled to compensation for Universal's licensing of the
Dracula image. For instance, the court suggested that
had Lugosi created a business to license his image whol-
ly separate from the rights he had granted to Universal
in his original movie contract, a property right may have
attached. 85 However, because he did not, that right was
lost upon Lugosi's death and could not be passed on to his
heirs. 8 6 Supporting this conclusion was an enlightened
concurrence: "Bela Lugosi was a talented actor. But he
was an actor, a practitioner of thespian arts; he was not
a playwright, an innovator, a creator or an entrepreneur.
As an actor he memorized lines and portrayed roles writ-
ten for him, albeit with consummate skill."8 7 Merely
playing a role creates no inheritable property right in an
actor without a contract so explicitly providing, especial-
ly in a case such as this where various other actors have
played the same role.
8 8
The Lugosi case, therefore, suggests that an actor can
create a property right in a film or TV performance.
However, unless that right is asserted through contract
or commercial exploitation during that actor's lifetime, it
ends with the actor's death. Still, this case makes the
powerful assertion that actors' performances are unique
and separate from the authorship of a character as
embodied in a screenplay or other source material. That
is, the performance itself is a valuable commodity sepa-
rate not only from the film as a whole, but also from the
actor's own image, as asserted in Eastwood, Hoffman,
White, and Allen.
8 9
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY = RIGHT
TO PROFIT: JAMES DEAN
In Lugosi, property rights in a character were held not
to be inheritable because the celebrity had failed to
assert those rights during his lifetime. Stepping back to
the celebrity's right of publicity in his or her own image
(i.e., independent of a specific character in a specific
movie), however, we find a fully inheritable right. In fact,
compared to the previous cases discussed, this is rela-
tively simple contract law, as illustrated by Warner
Brothers, Inc. v Curtis Management Group, Inc. (the
"Dean" case). There, Warner Brothers unsuccessfully
sought to enjoin the heirs of movie icon James Dean from
profiting from the use of his image in merchandising
licenses. 90
In 1954, James Dean signed a standard form employ-
ment contract with Warner Brothers to star in what
turned out to be his only three film roles: East of Eden,
Rebel Without a Cause, and Giant.9 1 In this contract,
Dean gave to Warner Brothers the right to photograph
his "acts, poses, plays and appearances of any all kinds.
• .and to distribute and exploit the same in motion pic-
ture films, or otherwise ... ."92 Dean's heirs, who subse-
quent to his death formed a for-profit corporation to
exploit his likeness in merchandising, argued that the
contract terminated upon Dean's death and his right to
publicity reverted to his heirs. 9 3 Warner Brothers coun-
tered by claiming that the key phrase "or otherwise" in
the contract conveyed the merchandising rights to them,
exclusively and in perpetuity. 94  However, because
Dean's contract, unlike similar employment contracts
executed by Warner at that time, contained no express
merchandising provision, the court was not persuaded by
Warner Brothers' argument. 95 Instead, the court inter-
preted the contract as giving Warner Brothers rights only
to produce, reproduce, exhibit, advertise, and sell the
motion pictures made pursuant to its contract. Dean,
therefore, retained his right to publicity, which then
passed to his heirs. Lastly, the court held that the ter-
minology "acts, poses, plays and appearances" from the
contract was not the same thing as "name and like-
ness."9 6 Thus, while Warner Brothers retained the right
to profit from the films which made Dean's image a com-
modity, it did not own his right to publicity.
Although the "Dean" and Lugosi cases deal with some-
what similar issues, the "Dean" case does not draw a
bright line between an actor's image (i.e., right to public-
ity) and his film roles. Surely Dean's heirs licensed
images of Dean that evoked-if not outright replicated-
the images of Dean in the film roles that Warner
Brothers owned but could not create Dean-related mer-
chandise from. "Dean" thus illustrates that the right to
publicity is something that is not inalienable, but can be
transferred by contract.
THE ONGOING DEBATE
As the courts continue to re-interpret the right of pub-
licity, and various states add to the confusion with
statutes that protect the right to varying degrees, the
spectrum of views on just how broadly-or how narrow-
ly-the right of publicity
should be construed
remains predictably
wide. What seems to be
lacking, however, is a
comprehensive analyti-
cal framework for deal-
ing with what property
interests arise from
celebrity and whom those
interests should benefit.
In developing such a framework, reference to more
traditional forms of intellectual property gives an appro-
priate starting point. Speaking on the impulses and
incentives behind creation, commentators have suggest-
ed that the "natural law" of property must allow creators
to build on previous creations without legal interfer-
ence. 97 One scholar writes:
One cannot assume the early creators or their
heirs would consent to the use of property of
others to create new intellectual products if
the first creators had control of these neces-
sary prior resources. Some might consent...
without compensation. Some might agree to
compensated use. But others might refuse to
sell altogether or charge more than the new
creators can afford .... The cost of tracing
ownership and effective transactions might
itself be prohibitive. 98
For example, both Romeo and Juliet and West Side
Story are based on the same basic plot, but until a twen-
tieth-century Second Circuit Court of Appeals made it
clear the story itself could not be owned, any number of
potential producer-plaintiffs claiming ownership of this
story could have each demanded payment from any
future writers or authors using the same basic story-
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The application of such a thesis to the right of publici-
ty reveals that the right should be limited-and perhaps
suggests that celebrity personae are, by their very
nature, part of the public domain. Therefore, subsequent
creative works should not be hampered by injunctions or
damage claims that hinder the continued growth of the
creative process. After all, "if perpetual property existed
in all intangibles, many creators would have to choose
between using someone else's property without permis-
sion, or forgoing creation of their own .... For new cre-
ations to flourish, they must be able to draw on an array
of prior creations that
are not privately
owned." 10 0
This point seems par-
ticularly insightful
where the element of
''creation" at issue is
mere personal image.
Just as one writer may
draw on a previous
writer's material for inspiration, influence, or homage,
many celebrities consciously or unconsciously emulate
former stars in some manner. But unlike books, songs, or
movies, a celebrity persona is not a tangible thing, and
the line gets very murky when one attempts to decipher
which specific combination of human traits-be it cloth-
ing, hairstyles, makeup, voice, or facial bone structure-
constitutes the essence of an image. Moreover, seldom do
celebrities truly "create" their own images. Rather, they
rely on the cultivated efforts of a team of people-man-
agers, agents, stylists, publicists, producers, directors,
and writers-who are collectively involved in the career
choices that any given celebrity has made in his or her
career path to stardom.
Thus, while abstract intellectual property theory lends
some insight into the competing interests at stake, shap-
ing the right of publicity by mere analogy to copyright or
trademark law is a muddlesome endeavor. Whereas
copyrightable works, such as books and music, have tan-
gible aspects of expression that can be analyzed by judges
and juries, the celebrity image is not so easy to scruti-
nize. A personal image is a fluid and elusive beast, as
ever-changing as a chameleon, and the perception of that
image is highly subjective and dependent on the individ-
ual perceiver. A character in a book or movie is copy-
rightable because it exists on paper or on celluloid with-
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in the tangible framework of a story; a celebrity's image,
on the other hand, is intangible and exists in the bound-
less framework of the mass media. Thus, although a
writer may be able to "own" a character and transfer that
ownership by copyright, a celebrity should not be able to
exert total control over the way his or her image is
manipulated in the media or drawn upon by the public
for new creative works.
Imagine, for example, if Marilyn Monroe had been
able to copyright her image. Could she and her heirs con-





for infringement on her
"image" and/or reputa-
tional damage to that
image? Imagine trying to
prove in a court of law what constitutes that image.
Would a plaintiff contend that bottles of peroxide, breast
enlargement surgery, and a put-on voice were all mali-
cious calculations unlawfully used to appropriate one
movie star's image for another's gain? So far, the right of
publicity hasn't extended that far, but with cases such as
White and Allen, it appears headed in that direction.
To tame the growing legal beast that is the right-of-
publicity celebrity image, courts should begin by drawing
a distinction between "on-camera" image-that is,
images created and evoked in particular films, movies, or
other tangible works-and "cumulative image"-that is,
an intangible image formed by a celebrity's deliberate
choices to present himself or herself to the public in a cer-
tain way.
The on-camera image is well-suited to present legal
doctrine. Cases like Hoffman, Lugosi, and White each
dealt with this concept, as the celebrities in those cases
tried to assert rights based on an image they embodied in
conjunction with a specific, tangible production (Tootsie,
Dracula, and Wheel of Fortune, respectively). Although
the Hoffman and White decisions may have stretched the
right of publicity too far, they at least present a tangible
framework-a specific set of physical and stylistic fash-
ion choices that can be identified within an existing
movie or TV show-with which to make a judgment. In
on-camera image cases, the right of publicity could fairly
extend to the created "image" presented in tangible
entertainment programs. However, the celebrity per-
former should not be given an exclusive interest in that
image because on-camera images are virtually never the
product of the celebrity alone. Thus, regardless of
whether the celebrity is the sole plaintiff, the star should
not be granted the full monetary judgment even if he or
she can prove damages in a right of publicity claim.
The cumulative-image aspect of the right of publicity,
however, is even more difficult for courts to handle.
Examples of cumulative image cases would be Allen and
"Dean" (as well as the aforementioned Monroe hypothet-
ical), where the image
involved is not confined to
a specific, tangible produc-
tion, but rather, a more
esoteric, theoretical idea
of what human physical
characteristics the public
associates with a given
celebrity. The only way to
construct a legal framework for these types of cases
would be to restrict recovery to cases involving actual
unauthorized impersonation of a celebrity's cumulative
image-with attention given to First Amendment and
fair-use parody concerns. Much like the "actual malice"
standard in Sullivan, anything beyond such a limitation
would simply prove too elusive, too esoteric, and too sub-
ject to abuse for courts to impose.
What is needed is a balance that allows a certain nec-
essary flexibility in the right of publicity-protecting
celebrities where a true personalized interest is at stake,
but keeping the range of creative possibilities open for
future performers. Such a balance would favor results
like that in Eastwood by recognizing that celebrities
should not lose the right to protect their reputations
against false information simple because they voluntari-
ly gave up their privacy and anonymity upon entering
the most public of professions. 10 1 Conversely, it would
reject the outcomes of Hoffman and White on the grounds
that they interfere with the First Amendment and give
celebrities unwarranted control-particularly when eco-
nomically motivated-over personae that are rightfully
donated to the public.
Thus, given that the celebrity image is-whether on-
camera or cumulative-an inherently collaborative
beast, the law should shield the end product of that col-
laboration from tarnish only to the extent of protection
from outright impersonation (e.g., Allen or knowing
falsehood (e.g., Eastwood Sullivan). Otherwise, a liberal
interpretation of the First Amendment should foster
maximum freedom of expression, allowing future cre-
ators to draw on a celebrity's image just as current
celebrities have undoubtedly drawn on their equally
famous predecessors in creating their own images.
PRIVACY, REPUTATION, &
PROPERTY
The foregoing cases are but a sampling of the evolution
of publicity rights law as it relates to Hollywood celebri-
ties. As more and more jurisdictions begin to recognize
the right of publicity as a separate, celebrity-only right
distinguishable from the right to privacy, the scope and
breadth of the right seem to grow exponentially. At one
end of the right are the simple contract principles of the
right to publicity as a bargained-for proprietary interest
in relation to motion-picture merchandising ("Dean"). At
the other end of the spectrum, though, lies the unwar-
ranted expansion of the right of publicity, where stars
can control even parody use of images that may only
vaguely evoke or suggest their own images (White,
Allen), where an actor can lay claim to merchandising
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rights of a character he once played but didn't create
(Lugosi), and where a celebrity can dictate the use of pub-
licity photos in movie star fan magazines (Hoffman).
As always, the best solution lies somewhere in the
middle. In other words, the right of publicity should exist
to protect celebrities from the unfair or unauthorized tar-
nishing of their images, but not to provide them with
even more control over the press and more ways to gen-
erate income. Eastwood seems to provide this result and
may alone signal the appropriate example for subsequent
courts and legislatures to follow. But sadly, the call is not
always being heard. In many state statutes, the right of
publicity is coming dangerously close to infringing on
First Amendment rights. It is not unforeseeable that
someday we may have movie stars testifying at a
Congressional hearing about how they need more
statutes to protect their precious and valuable images.
With all the control celebrities currently wield over the
business aspects of the entertainment industry, will the
seductive power of their fame continue to impress, intox-
icate, and influence lawmakers as well?
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